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The Economics of Tobacco Control in Nigeria: Modelling the Fiscal and 
Health Effects of a Tobacco Excise Tax Change  
Precious C. Akanonu, Joseph Ishaku and Chukwuka Onyekwena 
Summary 
This paper examines the potential for changes in the tobacco tax to contribute to raising 
government revenues, reducing tobacco use, and improving public health in Nigeria. 
Specifically, it estimates the impact of a change in the excise tax structure and level on 
cigarette consumption, government revenue, smoking prevalence, net-of-tax (NOT) revenue, 
and the excise tax burden. To this end, we ran the Tobacco Excise Tax Simulation Model 
(TETSiM), adapted by the researchers to calibrate for the Nigerian context. We modelled 
four different policy interventions or changes to the tobacco tax structure and level, under 
12 scenarios of economic/income growth (slow, medium, and high growth) and industry 
price response to an increase in excise taxes (either a full pass-through, or an under-shift or 
over-shift of the tax onto the retail price). We find that (1) cigarette consumption and 
smoking prevalence decrease in all 12 scenarios of possible economic/income growth and 
industry price changes under the policy interventions that impose higher tax levels and 
specific tax systems; (2) under all policy interventions and in all scenarios considered, 
government excise tax revenues from cigarette sales increase significantly but are most 
significant under the specific tax system, relative to the ad valorem tax system; (3) under all 
policy interventions, the best response to maximise NOT revenue for the tobacco industry is 
to increase the industry price; (4) under all policy interventions and in all scenarios 
considered, the excise tax burden to the consumer will at least double; however, since 
current excise tax burden is very low (at 4 per cent), the policy impact witnessed in the 
model remains minimal; and (5) we performed a three-year projection of the proposed policy 
change, which shows a consistent trend of increasing government revenues, decreasing 
consumption, and decreasing smoking prevalence rates if policy interventions are sustained 
each year over the three-year period. Based on the findings, we recommend that changes in 
tax policy need to be significant to have the desired effect on smoking prevalence. In 
particular, an effective tobacco control tax policy will require that: the tax system is changed 
from ad valorem to specific tax system; and the excise tax burden on tobacco products is 
continuously increased at least until it reaches 75 per cent.  
Keywords: tobacco taxation, tax modelling, Nigeria, Africa. 
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1. Introduction
The World Health Organization (WHO) emphasises that tobacco use is a significant hurdle 
to public health and development gains worldwide, as it imposes significant economic costs 
on countries both in terms of direct medical care for adults and lost productivity. Cigarette 
smoking and other forms of tobacco use impose a large and growing public health burden 
globally and in Nigeria. Globally, tobacco use is the most preventable cause of death. 
Statistics show that tobacco use caused 100 million deaths in the twentieth century, and if 
current trends continue unchecked, one billion people (about 10 million, one in six adults, 
per year) will die from tobacco-related causes in the twenty-first century (Blecher and Ross 
2013). Nearly 80 per cent of these deaths occur in low- and middle-income countries, 
especially in Asia (ibid.). Presently in Nigeria, more than 17,500 deaths are recorded each 
year on account of tobacco-related diseases; that is about 207 men and 130 women per 
week (Tobacco Atlas 2015).  
In the past, tobacco use and tobacco control in Africa received little attention relative to other 
regions and health issues. This was due to the perceived low smoking prevalence in Africa 
in addition to the more immediate need for interventions against infectious diseases. 
However, the trends are quickly changing. With improving economic growth and health in 
Africa, the number of smokers and cigarettes smoked in the region is rising. In Nigeria, 
smoking prevalence is growing at an average of 4 per cent each year; from 11.3 per cent in 
2000 to 17.4 per cent in 2015 (World Bank 2017). According to data from Nigeria Customs 
Service (NCS) and the GlobalData Plc, a total of 920 million cigarette packs were sold in 
Nigeria in 2015, of which 74 per cent were produced domestically.  
The increasing use of tobacco products and the recognition of its health and economic 
consequences have led to calls for the adoption and implementation of strong tobacco 
control measures. Economic theory suggests that, when consumers know all the risks and 
bear all the costs of their choices in an efficient market, there is no justification for 
governments to intervene in a market. However, there are two key inefficiencies (or market 
failures) in the tobacco market: inadequate information about the health risks of tobacco and 
risks of addiction; and physical or financial costs imposed on non-smokers. Therefore, there 
are clear economic grounds for intervening, particularly to protect young people and 
non-smokers.  
The use of price and tax measures to increase the retail price of tobacco products is widely 
recognised as the most effective way to curb demand for tobacco products and reduce 
diseases and deaths caused by tobacco use. The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC) Article 6 states that ‘price and tax measures are an effective and important 
means of reducing tobacco consumption by various segments of the population, in particular 
young persons’ (WHO 2005: 7). It is also widely documented that, other than the public 
health benefits of tobacco taxation, raising taxes on tobacco products can also boost 
government revenue in an appropriately structured tax policy regime (WHO 2015). In the 
Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, tobacco 
taxation features as a means of mobilising domestic resources to finance health and other 
development programmes.  
Empirical studies have shown that tobacco consumption decreases in the face of higher 
prices, and can increase government revenue (Chaloupka and Warner 1999; Sunley et al. 
2000; Van Walbeek 2010; Goodchild et al. 2016). Despite addictiveness, tobacco 
consumption decreases as a result of decreases in smoking prevalence (i.e. the number of 
people quitting or not starting to smoke) and smoking intensity (i.e. change in the average 
consumption of remaining smokers). More so, due to addictiveness, tobacco use is relatively 
price inelastic; as such, an increase in the tobacco excise tax can also increase government 
revenue. For every given percentage increase in the excise tax per cigarette, the percentage 
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decrease in cigarette consumption is smaller; thus resulting in an overall increase in 
government revenue. For instance, Sunley et al. (2000) provide estimates of the revenue-
generating potential of tax increases based on existing empirical evidence on price, tax, and 
demand elasticity for 70 countries. The authors conclude that an increase of 10 per cent in 
the tax on cigarettes in each of these countries would raise government revenues by nearly 
7 per cent on average for low- and middle-income countries. Therefore, tobacco taxation 
could be a win-win policy for governments: simultaneously reducing tobacco use and 
creating a fiscal space to finance development and/or health programmes.  
Therefore, this paper examines the potential for changes in the tobacco tax to contribute to 
raising government revenues, reducing tobacco use, and improving public health in Nigeria. 
Specifically, it estimates the impact of a change in the excise tax structure and level on 
cigarette consumption, government revenue, smoking prevalence, net-of-tax (NOT) 
revenue,1 and the excise tax burden. To this end, we ran the Tobacco Excise Tax Simulation 
Model (TETSiM), adapted by the researchers to calibrate for the Nigerian context.2  
The rest of the paper is organised into five parts. Section 2 presents a review of literature on 
the impact of tobacco taxes on consumption and government revenue. Section 3 presents 
the current state of tobacco taxes in Nigeria. Section 4 discusses the method and data, 
including sources, reliability, and coverage. Section 5 presents the results and analyses of 
the tobacco excise tax modelling, and Section 6 concludes the paper with some 
recommendations for tobacco taxation. 
2.  The relationship between tobacco taxes, 
consumption, and government revenue 
There is substantial consensus in extant literature on the effectiveness of tobacco taxation in 
tobacco control. However, most of this evidence is based on analysis carried out in 
developed countries in the global North. Specifically, Biener et al. (1998) studied the 
responsiveness of adult and teenage smokers to an increase in cigarette tax in 
Massachusetts, USA. They find that a modest price change led to smoking cessation among 
adult smokers and reduced cigarette consumption among low-income teenagers. A similar 
study in New York by Frieden et al. (2005) found substantial impacts, such as decline in 
smoking among adults, of a comprehensive set of tobacco control measures including 
increase in cigarette excise taxes. These impacts were consistent across all socioeconomic 
groups considered, including age groups, race/ethnicities, gender, education level, 
nationality, and location of residence. Studies in Australia (Scollo et al. 2003), Canada 
(Zhang et al. 2006), and the United Kingdom (Levy, Currie and Clancy 2013) reach similar 
conclusions about the relationship between tobacco taxes and consumption. A recurring 
theme among these studies is that they all examine the impact of tobacco taxes changes ex 
post. 
Although there are existing studies on the impact of tobacco tax changes for low- and 
middle-income countries, evidence remains scarce for Nigeria and the rest of sub-Saharan 
Africa, with the exception of South Africa. Many of the studies that make up the often-cited 
examination of literature across low- and middle-income countries, where an estimated 
                                                
1 Net-of-tax revenue refers to the total amount of net-of-tax revenue generated from cigarette sales. This is the 
gross revenue earned by cigarette manufacturers and sellers. 
2 We omitted the WHO Tobacco Tax Simulation Model (TaxSiM) due to the lack of data on the cost of production 
and quantity produced for each cigarette brand sold in Nigeria. 
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80 per cent of smokers live, are studies from Asia, the Gulf, Pacific and Caribbean Islands, 
and Latin America (Chaloupka, Yurekli and Fong 2012). 
Furthermore, studies focus on the public health impacts of tobacco use by prioritising 
indicators such as smoking intensity and cessation. This may be due to the motivation 
behind many studies and the bias in author composition towards researchers with expertise 
in health policy and practice (Chaloupka, Straif and Leon 2011). Little attention is given to 
the revenue implications of tax changes. However, Jha and Chaloupka (2000) estimate the 
cross-country revenue-generating potential of tobacco taxes and note that while tax 
increases were found to raise government revenues, increases tend to be larger in high-
income countries, where demand is less elastic and taxes account for a larger share of 
price. These fiscal implications are very important in the African context where the fiscal 
space is constrained and governments are not keen to pursue policies whose effect on fiscal 
revenues are uncertain. 
This study contributes to the literature in three unique ways. First, it provides evidence on 
the impacts of changes in tobacco taxes within the African context. Second, it provides an ex 
ante analysis by modelling the likely impact of tobacco tax changes, compared to ex post 
policy analysis that dominate the literature. Third, the study estimates the effects of tax 
changes on government revenues in addition to tracking impact on health outcomes. This is 
particularly useful in providing empirical evidence for ongoing policy debate around tobacco 
taxation in Nigeria and directly contributes to reducing uncertainties of likely fiscal impacts. 
3.  State of tobacco taxes in Nigeria  
(2017–baseline scenario)  
Nigeria’s tobacco taxation regime does not comply with the best practice tobacco taxation 
policies enshrined in Article 6 of the WHO FCTC. While WHO recommends an excise tax 
burden of 75 per cent of retail price and a specific excise tax system for effective tobacco 
taxation, the excise tax rate on tobacco products in Nigeria has an ad valorem tax structure 
levied at 20 per cent of UCA (not retail price). It is important to note that the excise tax rate 
has fallen since 2009, from 40 per cent. More so, VAT levied on locally consumed products 
in Nigeria, including tobacco products, stands at 5 per cent, which is among the lowest VAT 
rates globally. In addition to the VAT rate, other taxes are applicable to imported tobacco 
products. Imported cigarettes are excluded from excise tax, but accrue an import levy of 40 
per cent of CIF along with other smaller levies, such as the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation 
Scheme (ETLS), Comprehensive Import Supervision Scheme (CISS), and surcharge. The 
levies on imported cigarettes include: Import Duty (20 per cent of CIF); Levy (40 per cent of 
CIF); CISS (1 per cent of cost of goods or FOB); Surcharge (7 per cent of total value of duty 
payable); and ETLS (0.5 per cent of CIF) (NCS 2015). While imported cigarettes incur higher 
taxes, these taxes are not significant enough to drive wide price disparities.  
Given that Nigeria operates an ad valorem tax structure, all of these taxes are charged as a 
percentage of the value of tobacco products. According to the literature, the ad valorem tax 
structure is typically susceptible to undervaluation; encourages price reductions; 
disincentivises costly ‘quality’ improvements; and encourages ‘trading down’ in favour of 
cheaper tobacco products – thereby reducing health benefits (WHO 2010). While some of 
these issues can be addressed by establishing a minimum retail sales price as well as 
running a strong tax administration with technical capacity, Nigeria’s tobacco tax system 
does not incorporate a minimum retail sales price and the tax administrative system remains 
weak.  
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About 80 per cent of the tobacco products that are consumed in Nigeria are produced by 
three registered tobacco companies: British American Tobacco Nigeria (BATN), Leaf 
Tobacco and Commodities Nigeria Ltd, and International Tobacco. According to available 
data from Global Data Plc, 18.4 billion cigarettes sticks were sold in 2015, 12.2 billion 
(66.3 per cent) of which were domestically produced by the three main tobacco companies. 
BATN holds considerable market power, accounting for 75 per cent of overall domestic 
production – based on data from the Nigerian Customs Service. Hence the price of average 
pack of 20 cigarettes is very low, costing approximately ₦183.50 (US$0.51) as at 2017. 
4.  Methods and data sources  
4.1 Methodology  
We applied the Tobacco Excise Tax Simulation Model (TETSiM) as developed by the 
Economics of Tobacco Control Project, adapted and empirically applied by researchers to fit 
the local setting. The TETSiM is a simulation tool used by tobacco control advocates and 
government officials to consider the impacts of changes in tobacco excise taxes on a 
number of outcomes. The mathematical model that underpins the TETSiM is generic and 
can be calibrated to a variety of countries (TETSiM 2017). Using the TETSiM, we calculated 
the effects of four possible changes (policy interventions) in Nigeria’s tobacco tax structure 
and level on key outcomes. The measured outcomes include:  
• Government revenue – this includes revenue generated by excise taxes as well as 
the import duty, VAT, CISS, ETLS, and levy on cigarettes; 
• Cigarette consumption – the quantity of cigarettes smoked annually in Nigeria;  
• Smoking prevalence – the percentage of the adult population that smoke cigarettes; 
• Net-of-tax (NOT) revenue – the gross revenue earned by cigarette manufacturers 
and sellers; and  
• Excise tax burden – the proportion of tax in the retail price of cigarettes.  
The model consists of an initial equilibrium or baseline period, which is the current tax 
structure and level of 20 per cent ad valorem on UCA. Through simulations, new equilibria 
emerged that capture the effects of policy changes on the baseline tax structure and level on 
the key outcomes. Two sets of simulations were carried out: (1) once-off policy changes in 
the tobacco tax structure and level over a one-year period, and (2) the projected impact of 
policy changes on the key outcomes over a three-year period. In order to calibrate the 
TETSiM, we make a set of key assumptions, supported by literature. These include 
assumptions around price and income elasticities for licit and illicit cigarettes, the cross-price 
elasticity between illicit and licit cigarettes, as well as the proportion of a decrease in 
prevalence driven by a reduction in smoking intensity.  
Our model consists of five market segments, each of which is affected differently by 
government policies. The first three market segments consist of domestically produced 
cigarettes (premium, mid-priced, and economy), which are affected by changes in the excise 
tax policy. The fourth market segment consists of imported cigarettes, which are affected by 
changes in import levy. Given that  no excise tax is charged on imported cigarettes, 
policymakers make use of various import levies to affect the price of imported cigarettes. 
Finally, we also allow for an illicit trade segment of the market, which is not affected by a 
change in the tobacco tax structure and level, but rather by the legal tobacco industry’s 
response to changes in the tobacco tax policy.  
4.1.1 The TETSiM model  
In order to determine the sensitivities of various taxation policies and pricing strategies on 
the future tobacco landscape, a spreadsheet-based model is developed. The following 
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outputs are estimated: (1) predicted future cigarette consumption; (2) the predicted excise 
tax, net-of-tax, and retail price of a pack of cigarettes; (3) predicted future government 
cigarette excise tax revenue and total government cigarette tax revenues (from VAT and 
import tariffs); (4) predicted future net-of-tax revenue; and (5) smoking prevalence 
(TETSiM 2017).  
The retail price (P) is broken into two components: (1) the net-of-tax (NOT) price, and 
(2) taxes (excise tax, VAT, and tariffs). The net-of-tax is a catch-all category that represents 
the revenue distributed among all players along the tobacco value chain, i.e. primary 
producers, manufacturers, importers, logistical companies, wholesalers, and retailers. The 
contribution of each segment to the average retail price is weighted by its share of the 
market: domestic premium brands (36 per cent), domestic mid-priced brands (10 per cent), 
domestic economy brands (20 per cent), imported (24 per cent), and illicit (10 per cent).3  
In order to obtain the desired outputs, we input the values of the following variables: (1) the 
average growth in the real net-of-tax-price; (2) the price elasticity of demand; (3) the income 
elasticity of demand; (4) the excise tax rate, VAT rate, levy rate, import duty rate, CISS, and 
ETLS; and (5) the tax burden (i.e. the total tax as a percentage of the retail price). The base 
year was chosen as 2016.  
At the outset, the retail price is given as P1. The following formula is used to calculate the 
retail price in the next period (P2):  P2 = { 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 × �𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 +  𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷  + 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷�} +  {𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚−𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 × �𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚−𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚−𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚  +  𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚−𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚�} +  {𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒 ×
�𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒 +  𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒  +  𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒�} {�𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 ×  �𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚  +  𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 +  𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚  +  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑦𝑦𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚  + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚  +  𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚�� +  {𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 × (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)}                                       (1)    
At the outset, the excise tax (which in practice is expressed in naira per pack) is set as a 
percentage of the UCA of cigarettes (Excise1= 0.2*UCA1). The excise tax in the next period 
(Excise2) is given as:  
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀2 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀1  × (1 + ∆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷100 )                                                                                                  (2) 
Similarly, a change to import levy is given as:  
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦2 = 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦1  × (1 + ∆𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒100 )                                                                       (3) 
The net-of-tax price (NOT) is obtained as: 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 × (𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 −  𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 − 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) +
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 × �𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 −  𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 −  𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑦𝑦𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 −
𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚� +  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 × (𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)                                                                                       (4) 
  
                                                
3 Computations are based on Passport: Cigarettes in Nigeria, Euromonitor International, 2017.  
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We use the price elasticity (𝜀𝜀𝐼𝐼) and income elasticity (𝜀𝜀𝐸𝐸) formulae to solve for cigarette 
consumption of licit cigarettes in the next period (Q Licit2). Q Licit2 subtracts change in 
consumption of illicit cigarettes (∆Q Illicit1) from licit cigarette consumption. This is given as:  
𝑄𝑄 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀2 = �𝑄𝑄 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀1 × ��1+ 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝�𝑃𝑃2− 𝑃𝑃1𝑃𝑃2+ 𝑃𝑃1��
�1− 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝�𝑃𝑃2− 𝑃𝑃1𝑃𝑃2+ 𝑃𝑃1��� + ��1+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖�𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃2− 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃+ 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃1 ���1− 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖�𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃2− 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃2+ 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃1���� − ∆𝑄𝑄 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀                                  (5) 
GDP is gross domestic product and is used to represent national income levels.  
The consumption of illicit cigarettes is also affected by possible cross-price elasticity 
between illicit cigarettes and the cheapest licit cigarettes. That is, a decrease in the price of 
licit cigarettes due to an increase in tobacco tax may result in users switching to illicit 
cigarette consumption. Consumption of illicit cigarettes in the next period (Q Illicit2) is 
calculated as follows:  
𝑄𝑄 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀2 = 𝑄𝑄 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀1 × ��1+ 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝�𝑃𝑃2− 𝑃𝑃1𝑃𝑃2+ 𝑃𝑃1��
�1− 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝�𝑃𝑃2− 𝑃𝑃1𝑃𝑃2+ 𝑃𝑃1��� + ��1+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖�𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃2− 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃+ 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃1 ���1− 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖�𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃2− 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃2+ 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃1��� +
�
�1+ 𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐−𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝�𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 2− 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 1𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 2+ 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 1��
�1− 𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐−𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝�𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 2− 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 1𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 2+ 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 1���                                 
(6) 
Smoking prevalence (SP) is given as:  
SP2 = SP1 [1+ {
𝑄𝑄2−𝑄𝑄1(𝑄𝑄1+𝑄𝑄2)/2}] x ρ                                                                                                           (7)  
Where ρ is the percentage of decrease in cigarette consumption that is due to decrease in 
smoking prevalence.  
Smoking intensity (SI) is given as: 
SI1 = Q1/SP1                                                                                                                                          (8) 
We can easily calculate the following aggregates: 
• Total government revenue: 𝑄𝑄2 × �{𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 ×
�𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷�} + {𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚−𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 × �𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚−𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚�} +{𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒 × �𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒�} + {𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 ×(𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚)}�, where 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷, 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚−𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,  𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒 , 
and 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 represent taxes on domestically produced (premium brands, mid-priced 
brands, and economy brands) and imported cigarettes, respectively.  
 
• Total net-of-tax revenue: (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇2 ×  𝑄𝑄 𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀2)  +  (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇2 𝑋𝑋 𝑄𝑄 𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀2) 
A limitation of the TETSiM model is that it does not consider population growth and inflation 
in the three-year simulation.  
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4.2 Data  
4.2.1 Model inputs  
For the purpose of this study, data were mostly derived from national sources; both primary 
and secondary data collection (Table 1). Other data were sourced from international 
databases due to its unavailability in home country.  
The prices of cigarettes were collected from randomly selected kiosks, through a nationally 
representative survey across the six geopolitical zones in Nigeria (see Appendix 1): North 
Central, North-East, North-West, South-East, South-South, and South-West. A total of six 
states were surveyed: Abuja (North-Central), Adamawa (North-East), Kaduna (North-West), 
Anambra (South-East), Delta (South-South), and Lagos (South-West). The price bands for 
premium, mid-priced, and economy domestic market segments derived from Euromonitor 
International.  
Key secondary data were collected from national sources. Data on cigarette brands and the 
quantity of cigarette packs produced in Nigeria were provided on request by the Nigerian 
Customs Service (NCS). Data on taxes collected on cigarette products sold in Nigeria were 
also sourced from NCS. Data on GDP (income) and adult population were also collected 
from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Other secondary data include: total quantity of 
cigarettes consumed in the country – obtained from GlobalData Plc; smoking prevalence – 
World Bank; and price elasticity of demand, income elasticity of demand, illicit market share, 
and percentage increase in net-of-tax – obtained from the literature (see Kostova et al. 2013; 
Tauras et al. 2006; Gallus et al. 2006).  
A summary of key baseline data and their sources are presented in Table 1.  
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Table 1: A summary of key baseline data  
Item Baseline data Year Data sources 
Average cigarette retail price 
(domestic premium)* 
₦250 
2017 Primary – collected from six geopolitical zones in Nigeria 
Average cigarette retail price 
(domestic mid-priced) 
₦200 
Average cigarette retail price 
(domestic economy) 
₦150 
Average cigarette retail price 
(imported segment) 
₦180 
Average cigarette retail price 
(illicit segment)** 
₦100 
Domestic market share 66% 
2015 
NCS, GlobalData Plc, World 
Customs Journal, authors’ 
computation 
Imported market share 24% 
Illicit market share 10% 
Excise tax (based on unit cost 
of production – UCA) 
20% 2017 Nigerian Customs Service (NCS) 
VAT 5%,  2017 NCS 
Import duty + surcharge on 
duty payable 
20% + 7% = 21.4% 2017 NCS 
Levy 40% 2017 NCS 
ETLS 1% 2017 NCS 
CISS 0.5% 2017 NCS 
Adult population 106,257,431 2015 National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS) 
Smoking prevalence 5.6% 2015 World Health Organization 
GDP (US$) 405082.68 2016 World Bank 
Slow GDP growth projection −1.5% 
Authors’ computation using historical data 
from World Bank 
Medium GDP growth 
projection 
2.7% 
High GDP growth projection 4.9% 
Projected GDP growth rate – 
Year 1 (2017) 
1.2 
World Bank Projected GDP growth rate – Year 2 (2018) 
2.4 
Projected GDP growth rate – 
Year 3 (2019) 
2.5 
* The average retail price of cigarettes from our survey corroborates with WHO estimates of retail prices in Nigeria, as well as 
estimates from the Ministry of Finance. 
** We assume the average retail price of the cheapest cigarettes across regions represents the average retail price of the illicit 
market segment. 
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4.2.2 Assumptions about key parameters  
Price elasticities (𝜀𝜀𝐼𝐼 < 0): We assume five price elasticities of cigarette demand for each 
market segment (domestic premium, domestic mid-priced, domestic economy, imported, 
and illicit). For the licit market segments, the price elasticity of cigarette demand of -0.3 
(domestic premium), -0.4 (domestic mid-priced), -0.6 (domestic economy), and -0.5 
(imported) were selected based on literature (Kostova et al. 2013). We assume that demand 
for domestic premium cigarettes is most responsive to changes in price, while demand for 
domestic economy cigarettes is the least responsive to price changes. For the illicit market 
segments, the price elasticity of cigarette demand of -0.9 was selected, based on the 
assumption that the demand for illicit cigarettes is more responsive to price changes than 
the demand for licit cigarettes. The price elasticity is higher for the cheapest brand (illicit 
cigarettes) as these consumers cannot switch to an even cheaper brand.  
Cross-price elasticity (𝜀𝜀𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀 > 0): We assume a cross-price elasticity of demand from 
licit to illicit cigarettes to be 0.5. This is based on Tauras et al.’s (2006) study on cross-price 
elasticities between premium (licit in this study) and discount (inferior illicit) cigarettes. As the 
price of licit cigarettes increases, consumers of the cheapest licit brands are likely to switch 
to buying illicit cigarettes.  
Income elasticity (licit cigarettes: 𝜀𝜀𝐸𝐸 > 0; illicit cigarettes: 𝜀𝜀𝐸𝐸 < 0): We make the assumption 
that illicit cigarettes are inferior goods and therefore, any increase in income will lead to a 
decline in illicit cigarette consumption. Income elasticity for licit cigarettes is set at 0.5 
(Gallus et al. 2006), while we make an assumption that the income elasticity for illicit 
cigarettes is -0.5.  
Change in smoking prevalence: Cigarette consumption can decrease in one of two ways: 
either fewer people smoke (a decrease in smoking prevalence), or remaining smokers 
consume less (a decrease in smoking intensity). Some studies in developed countries on 
youth smoking suggest that about 50 per cent of the decrease in cigarette consumption can 
be ascribed to a decrease in smoking prevalence, while the other 50 per cent of the 
decrease in cigarette consumption can be ascribed to a decrease in smoking intensity. Since 
there is no consensus for developing countries, we assume the 50 per cent found to be 
applicable to developed countries (TETSiM 2017).  
It is worth noting that model estimates are influenced by the key parameters outlined above, 
which are calibrated based on model specification and with guidance from the literature. If in 
reality these parameters happen to fall significantly away from current calibrations, the 
reliability of the results will be in doubt. However, we are confident that our calibration is 
viable and yields credible estimates, given available evidence and expert guidance. 
4.3 Proposed policy interventions  
Four possible policy interventions were used for the tax simulations in our TETSiM. These 
are summarised in Table 2.  
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Table 2: Possible policy interventions  
 Policy intervention Description 
Policy intervention 1 
(PI.1) 
Keep 20 per cent ad valorem tax, 
include ₦20 specific tax, and 
increase import levy to 50 per 
cent of CIF per pack. 
This policy intervention represents the 
government’s plans to retain the 
present ad valorem tax on tobacco 
while introducing a specific tax and 
increasing import levy from 40 to 50 
per cent for 2018. 
Policy intervention 2 
(PI.2) 
Change to specific tax system, set 
the excise tax burden to ₦30 per 
pack, and increase import levy to 
50 per cent of CIF per pack. 
This policy intervention simulates a 
complete change from ad valorem to 
specific tax system set at ₦30 per pack, 
which translates to 50 per cent specific 
excise duty on UCA (₦60). It also 
accommodates an increase in import 
levy to 50 per cent. 
Policy intervention 3 
(PI.3) 
Change to specific tax system, set 
the excise tax burden to ₦60 per 
pack, and increase import levy to 
50 per cent of CIF per pack. 
This policy intervention simulates a 
complete change from ad valorem to 
specific tax system set at ₦60 per pack, 
which translates to 100 per cent 
specific excise duty on UCA. It also 
accommodates an increase in import 
levy to 50 per cent.  
Policy intervention 4 
(PI.4) 
Change to specific tax system, set 
the excise tax burden to the 
equivalent of 75 per cent of 
current retail price, and increase 
import levy to 50 per cent of CIF 
per pack. 
This policy intervention simulates a 
complete change from ad valorem to 
specific tax system in line with the 
WHO recommended 75 per cent 
benchmark, which is equivalent to 
₦139 specific tax per pack for Nigeria. 
It also accommodates an increase in 
import levy to 50 per cent.  
 
While PI.1 and PI.4 are motivated by current government plans and WHO recommendations 
respectively, PI.2 and PI.3 are included to provide a picture of what more intermediate tax 
changes may imply. Also, these additional proposals highlight what is possible with a 
change from ad valorem to specific taxation without radically increasing the tax burden as in 
PI.3 and PI.4. 
4.4 Sensitivity analysis  
4.4.1 Sensitivity analysis 1: Assumptions on economic growth and industry response  
We model 12 possible scenario outcomes for different possible growth rates against 
possible industry responses. Given the sequence of the events that lead to changes in the 
outcomes of interest, the different scenarios are relevant for providing an overview of the 
possibilities, before uncertainties around tobacco industry response and future economic 
conditions are resolved. Table 3 provides a description of scenarios for income growth and 
industry price changes used in the model.  
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4.4.1.1 Economic/income growth rates  
We use four growth rate options (no growth, slow, medium, and high growth). The slow, 
medium, and high growth rates used were sourced from the World Bank (see Table 1).4 
4.4.1.2 Industry response  
For the licit cigarette market, we use three potential industry responses to a change in the 
excise tax rate (no change in NOT price, a 10 per cent decrease in NOT price, and a 10 per 
cent increase in NOT price). We expect industry response not to fall too far from the narrow 
band of (−of xpec.). Moreover, the amount by which the industry can raise the NOT price is 
limited by potential competitive pressures, and by the marginal consumption that the industry 
is willing to give up. Generally, the tobacco industry tends to decrease the NOT price when 
trying to break into the market, otherwise they increase the NOT price if they have 
substantial market share (TETSiM 2017). For the illicit market segment, we make the 
assumption that it is linked to licit industry response. That is, if the licit industry price 
increases by 10 per cent, so will that of the illicit industry.  
Table 3: Sensitivity analysis – income growth and industry response scenarios 
 Scenarios Assumption on income growth Assumption on industry price 
Scenario 1 (S.1) No income growth effect No change in industry price 
Scenario 2 (S.2) No income growth effect Industry price increases by 10% 
Scenario 3 (S.3) No income growth effect Industry price decreases by 10% 
Scenario 4 (S.4) Slow economic growth No change in industry price 
Scenario 5 (S.5) Slow economic growth Industry price increases by 10% 
Scenario 6 (S.6) Slow economic growth Industry price decreases by 10% 
Scenario 7 (S.7) Medium economic growth No change in industry price 
Scenario 8 (S.8) Medium economic growth Industry price increases by 10% 
Scenario 9 (S.9) Medium economic growth Industry price decreases by 10% 
Scenario 10 (S.10) High economic growth No change in industry price 
Scenario 11 (S.11) High economic growth Industry price increases by 10% 
Scenario 12 (S.12) High economic growth Industry price decreases by 10% 
4.4.2 Sensitivity analysis 2: A three-year projection of results (in 2016 prices)  
We simulate a three-year projection of results accounting for no economic growth and World 
Bank-projected economic growth (for 2017, 2018, and 2019), as well as potential industry 
response (retain, increase, or decrease NOT price). We implement the four policy 
interventions outlined in Table 2 in the base year, and subsequently assume an increase in 
specific excise tax of ₦20 (in 2016 prices) per year under PI.1, and an increase in the excise 
tax burden in retail price by two percentage points annually for PI.2, PI.3, and PI.4. This 
analysis aims to provide a more dynamic view of the potential impact of alternative policy 
proposals over the short-to-medium term. This is particularly relevant for gradual tax reform 
                                                
4 World bank data on GDP World Bank (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?view=chart). 
17 
and provides options on how to implement dynamic and targeted multi-year tobacco tax 
adjustments. 
5.  Results and analysis  
Using the TETSiM, we calculated the effects of four possible changes (policy interventions) 
in Nigeria’s tobacco tax structure and level on key measured outcomes.  
5.1 Baseline (2016) results  
Our results provide estimates of the impact of policy changes in cigarette excise tax on 
average cigarette consumption, government revenue, smoking prevalence, net-of-tax 
revenue and tax burden in the baseline period.  
A. Cigarette consumption  
We find consumption decreases in all scenarios under PI.3 and PI.4 – which impose higher 
tax levels and specific tax systems. Changes in tax policy need to be significant to have the 
desired effect on cigarette consumption under all scenarios considered.  
Specifically, under the government-proposed policy intervention which entails retaining the 
current 20 per cent ad valorem plus a 20 naira specific tax (PI.1), cigarette consumption will 
fall by the largest percentage (-7.58 per cent) if there is slow economic/income growth in the 
country and the tobacco industry price increases by 10 per cent (S.5). However, this policy 
intervention will have a counteractive effect on cigarette consumption if there is high 
economic/income growth and the industry decreases prices by 10 per cent (S.9) – this will in 
fact lead to a 2.19 per cent increase in the quantity of cigarettes consumed in the country. 
Under the WHO-proposed policy intervention, which entails changing the tax 
system/structure from ad valorem to specific that is equal to 75 per cent of the current retail 
price of cigarettes (PI.4), we can expect an average of -18.52 per cent decrease in the 
quantity of cigarettes consumed in all 12 scenarios. The largest decrease (-25.47 per cent) 
occurs where there is slow economic growth and the industry price increases (S.5). This 
finding is intuitive given the negative impact of slow economic growth and price increase on 
demand. The results of other alternative policy interventions on cigarette consumption (PI.2 
and PI.3) can be found in Table 4.  
B. Government revenue (excise tax revenue)  
We find that under all policy interventions and in all scenarios considered, government 
excise tax revenue from cigarette sales will increase significantly. This implies that there is a 
very wide scope for increasing tax revenue without adversely affecting fiscal revenue. The 
increase in excise tax revenues is more pronounced under specific tax system (as in PI.3 
and PI.4) relative to ad valorem tax system (as in PI.1 and PI.2).  
Under the government-proposed PI.1, excise tax revenue is expected to increase by an 
average of 157 per cent across all 12 scenarios. Excise tax revenue is highest under S.12 
(from a baseline revenue of ₦7.3 billion to ₦19.7 billion) where there is high economic 
growth and industry decrease price by 10 per cent. Under the WHO-proposed PI.4, excise 
tax revenue is expected to increase by an average of 803 per cent across all 12 scenarios. 
However, excise tax revenue is highest under S.1 (from ₦7.3 billion to ₦76.1 billion) where 
there is no change in either income growth or industry price. A full summary of the impact of 
the various policy scenarios on government excise tax revenue is presented in Table 5.  
C. Smoking prevalence  
As with the cigarette consumption findings, changes in tax policy need to be significant to 
have the desired effect on smoking prevalence under all scenarios considered. Smoking 
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prevalence decreases in all scenarios under PI.3 and PI.4 – which impose higher tax levels 
and specific tax systems relative to PI.1 and P1.2.  
Under the government-proposed PI.1, smoking prevalence will fall by the largest percentage 
under S.5 (from a baseline of 5.6 per cent to 5.39 per cent). However, smoking prevalence 
will rise under the scenario where there is high economic/income growth and the industry 
decreases price by 10 per cent (S.12) to 5.66 per cent. These two conditions make 
cigarettes more affordable for consumers, hence the rise in prevalence. Under the 
WHO-proposed PI.4, we can expect smoking prevalence to fall to at least 5.29 per cent 
(S.1). The largest decrease (4.89 per cent) occurs where there is slow economic growth and 
the industry price increases (S.5). The results of other alternative policy interventions (PI.2 
and PI.3) can be found in Table 6.  
D. Net-of-tax (NOT) revenue  
We find that under all policy interventions, the optimal response for the tobacco industry is to 
increase industry price in order to maximise NOT revenue. The industry stands to lose 
revenue when they do nothing or decrease industry price in response to policy interventions.  
Under PI.1 and PI.2, the NOT revenue of the tobacco industry from cigarette sales will only 
rise when they pass on some of the tax burden to consumers by increasing industry price. 
The industry stands to lose revenue when they do nothing or take up the tax burden (by 
decreasing industry price) in efforts to possibly frustrate policy interventions. Specifically, 
under the government-proposed PI.1, the NOT revenue of the tobacco industry will rise most 
significantly under S.11 (from a baseline revenue of ₦154 billion to ₦162.3 billion) where 
there is high economic growth and the industry price increases by 10 per cent. However, the 
industry will record the largest decrease under S.6 (from ₦154 billion to ₦137.3 billion) 
where there is slow economic growth and the industry price decreases by 10 per cent.  
Under the WHO-recommended PI.4, the tobacco industry will record a decline in its NOT 
revenue in all scenarios. The worst outcome for the industry occurs in S.6; it stands to lose 
around one-third of its revenue (-32.6 per cent) where there is slow economic growth and 
the industry price decreases by 10 per cent. Table 7 provides a summary of the impact of 
excise tax changes on NOT revenue under all policy scenarios.   
E. Excise tax burden  
We find that under all policy interventions and in all scenarios considered, the excise tax 
burden to the consumer will at least double. However, since current excise tax burden is 
very low (at 4 per cent), the policy impact witnessed in the model remains minimal relative to 
the WHO-recommended excise tax burden. This implies that the political will for tobacco 
control policies has to be strong and consistent in order to raise the excise tax burden to 
meet the WHO-recommended level of 75 per cent of retail price.  
Intuitively, the excise tax burden increases more when the tobacco industry decreases the 
industry price. Under PI.1, the excise tax burden will increase from a baseline of 4.0 per cent 
to about 10.2 per cent in all scenarios where the industry price decreases (S.3, S.6, S.9, 
S12). Under P1.4, the excise tax burden increases most significantly (to 27.0 per cent) in 
S.3. The results are presented in Table 8.   
In terms of setting policy targets and monitoring impact, tracking the excise tax burden is a 
more useful indicator compared to the excise tax rate. The excise tax burden shows the 
impact of policy interventions after the industry response, whereas simply focusing on the 
excise tax rate will mask the pass-through effect on retail prices. For instance, even after 
implementing the 75 per cent excise tax rate in PI.4, the result shows that the excise tax 
burden does not exceed 27 per cent under all 12 scenarios.  Hence, the focus of policy 
interventions should not be on the level of the excise tax levied but on the burden after price 
changes.  
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Table 4: Cigarette consumption (in millions of sticks) 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 Scenario 9 Scenario 10 Scenario 11 Scenario 12 
Average 
Assumption on 
industry price 
No change in 
industry 
price 
Industry 
price 
increases by 
10% 
Industry 
price 
decreases by 
10% 
No change in 
industry 
price 
Industry 
price 
increases by 
10% 
Industry 
price 
decreases by 
10% 
No change in 
industry 
price 
Industry 
price 
increases by 
10% 
Industry 
price 
decreases by 
10% 
No change in 
industry 
price 
Industry 
price 
increases by 
10% 
Industry 
price 
decreases by 
10% 
Assumption on 
income growth 
No income 
growth effect 
No income 
growth effect 
No income 
growth effect 
Slow 
economic 
growth 
Slow 
economic 
growth 
Slow 
economic 
growth 
Medium 
economic 
growth 
Medium 
economic 
growth 
Medium 
economic 
growth 
High 
economic 
growth 
High 
economic 
growth 
High 
economic 
growth 
Baseline 920 920 920 920 920 920 920 920 920 920 920 920 920 
Policy 
intervention 1 891 864 920 882 850 914 899 868 931 909 877 940 895 
Percentage 
change relative 
to the baseline 
-3.19 -6.04 0.03 -4.14 -7.58 -0.70 -2.25 -5.69 1.19 -1.25 -4.69 2.19 -2.68 
Policy 
intervention 2 882 856 910 871 839 902 888 856 920 897 866 929 885 
Percentage 
change relative 
to the baseline 
-4.18 -6.92 -1.09 -5.35 -8.79 -1.91 -3.47 -6.91 -0.03 -2.46 -5.90 0.98 -3.84 
Policy 
intervention 3 861 838 887 843 811 875 860 829 892 869 838 901 859 
Percentage 
change relative 
to the baseline 
-6.41 -8.91 -3.61 -8.38 -11.83 -4.94 -6.50 -9.94 -3.06 -5.49 -8.93 -2.05 -6.67 
Policy 
intervention 4 819 780 809 717 686 749 735 703 766 744 712 776 750 
Percentage 
change relative 
to the baseline 
-11.00 -15.25 -12.08 -22.03 -25.47 -18.59 -20.14 -23.58 -16.70 -19.13 -22.58 -15.69 -18.52 
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Table 5: Government revenue 
Excise tax revenue (million naira) 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 Scenario 9 Scenario 10 Scenario 11 Scenario 12 
Average 
Assumption 
on industry 
price 
No change 
in industry 
price 
Industry 
price 
increases 
by 10% 
Industry 
price 
decreases 
by 10% 
No change 
in industry 
price 
Industry 
price 
increases 
by 10% 
Industry 
price 
decreases 
by 10% 
No change 
in industry 
price 
Industry 
price 
increases 
by 10% 
Industry 
price 
decreases 
by 10% 
No change 
in industry 
price 
Industry 
price 
increases by 
10% 
Industry 
price 
decreases by 
10% 
Assumption 
on income 
growth 
No income 
growth 
effect 
No income 
growth 
effect 
No income 
growth 
effect 
Slow 
economic 
growth 
Slow 
economic 
growth 
Slow 
economic 
growth 
Medium 
economic 
growth 
Medium 
economic 
growth 
Medium 
economic 
growth 
High 
economic 
growth 
High 
economic 
growth 
High 
economic 
growth 
Baseline 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 
Policy 
intervention 1 18.6 18.2 19.2 18.4 17.8 19.0 18.9 18.2 19.5 19.1 18.5 19.7 18.8 
Percentage 
change 
relative to the 
baseline 
 +155  +148  +163  +152  +143  +160  +158  +149  +166  +161  +153  +170 +156.5 
Policy 
intervention 2 22.9 22.4 23.6 22.6 21.8 23.3 23.1 22.3 23.9 23.4 22.7 24.2 23.0 
Percentage 
change 
relative to the 
baseline 
 +214  +206  +223  +208  +198  +219  +216  +206  +227  +220  +210  +231 +214.8 
Policy 
intervention 3 33.2 32.5 34.0 32.2 31.0 33.3 33.0 31.8 34.2 33.5 32.3 34.7 33.0 
Percentage 
change 
relative to the 
baseline 
 +354  +344  +365  +340  +324  +356  +351  +335  +368  +358  +342  +374 +350.8 
Policy 
intervention 4 76.1 72.3 73.6 61.6 58.7 64.5 63.7 60.8 66.7 64.9 61.9 67.8 66.1 
Percentage 
change 
relative to the 
baseline 
 +940  +889  +906  +742  +702  +782  +771  +731  +812  +787  +747  +827 +803.0 
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Table 6: Smoking prevalence (in percentage) 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 Scenario 9 Scenario 10 Scenario 11 Scenario 12 
Assumption 
on industry 
price 
No change in 
industry price 
Industry price 
increases by 
10% 
Industry price 
decreases by 
10% 
No change in 
industry price 
Industry price 
increases by 
10% 
Industry price 
decreases by 
10% 
No change in 
industry price 
Industry price 
increases by 
10% 
Industry 
price 
decreases by 
10% 
No change in 
industry price 
Industry price 
increases by 
10% 
Industry 
price 
decreases by 
10% 
Assumption 
on income 
growth 
No income 
growth effect 
No income 
growth effect 
No income 
growth effect 
Slow 
economic 
growth 
Slow 
economic 
growth 
Slow 
economic 
growth 
Medium 
economic 
growth 
Medium 
economic 
growth 
Medium 
economic 
growth 
High 
economic 
growth 
High 
economic 
growth 
High 
economic 
growth 
Baseline 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 
Policy 
intervention 1 5.51 5.43 5.6 5.48 5.39 5.58 5.54 5.44 5.63 5.57 5.47 5.66 
Percentage 
change 
relative to 
baseline 
-1.61 -3.04 0.00 -2.14 -3.75 -0.36 -1.07 -2.86 0.54 -0.54 -2.32 1.07 
Policy 
intervention 2 5.48 5.41 5.57 5.45 5.35 5.55 5.5 5.41 5.6 5.53 5.43 5.63 
Percentage 
change 
relative to 
baseline 
-2.14 -3.39 -0.54 -2.68 -4.46 -0.89 -1.79 -3.39 0.00 -1.25 -3.04 0.54 
Policy 
intervention 3 5.42 5.35 5.5 5.37 5.27 5.46 5.42 5.32 5.51 5.45 5.35 5.54 
Percentage 
change 
relative to 
baseline 
-3.21 -4.46 -1.79 -4.11 -5.89 -2.50 -3.21 -5.00 -1.61 -2.68 -4.46 -1.07 
Policy 
intervention 4 5.29 5.17 5.26 4.98 4.89 5.08 5.04 4.94 5.13 5.06 4.97 5.16 
Percentage 
change 
relative to 
baseline 
-5.54 -7.68 -6.07 -11.07 -12.68 -9.29 -10.00 -11.79 -8.39 -9.64 -11.25 -7.86 
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Table 7: Net-of-tax revenue (billion naira) 
 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 Scenario 9 Scenario 10 Scenario 11 Scenario 12 
Aver
age 
Assumption on 
industry price 
No change 
in industry 
price 
Industry 
price 
increases 
by 10% 
Industry 
price 
decreases 
by 10% 
No change 
in industry 
price 
Industry 
price 
increases 
by 10% 
Industry 
price 
decreases 
by 10% 
No change 
in industry 
price 
Industry 
price 
increases 
by 10% 
Industry 
price 
decreases 
by 10% 
No change in 
industry 
price 
Industry 
price 
increases by 
10% 
Industry 
price 
decreases by 
10% 
Assumption on 
income growth 
No income 
growth 
effect 
No income 
growth 
effect 
No income 
growth 
effect 
Slow 
economic 
growth 
Slow 
economic 
growth 
Slow 
economic 
growth 
Medium 
economic 
growth 
Medium 
economic 
growth 
Medium 
economic 
growth 
High 
economic 
growth 
High 
economic 
growth 
High 
economic 
growth 
Baseline 154.0 154.0 154.0 154.0 154.0 154.0 154.0 154.0 154.0 154.0 154.0 154.0 154 
Policy 
intervention 1 149.1 159.6 138.3 147.6 157.0 137.3 150.8 160.4 140.1 152.4 162.3 141.6 150 
Percentage 
change relative 
to the baseline -3.2 3.6 -10.2 -4.2 1.9 -10.9 -2.1 4.2 -9.0 -1.0 5.4 -8.0 -2.79 
Policy 
intervention 2 147.6 158.1 136.8 145.7 154.9 135.6 148.9 158.4 138.4 150.6 160.3 140.0 148 
Percentage 
change relative 
to the baseline -4.2 2.7 -11.2 -5.4 0.6 -12.0 -3.3 2.9 -10.1 -2.2 4.1 -9.1 -3.94 
Policy 
intervention 3 144.1 154.7 133.3 141.1 149.8 131.4 144.3 153.3 134.3 146.0 155.2 135.8 144 
Percentage 
change relative 
to the baseline -6.4 0.4 -13.5 -8.4 -2.7 -14.7 -6.3 -0.5 -12.8 -5.2 0.8 -11.8 -6.76 
Policy 
intervention 4 127.3 133.8 112.3 110.9 117.1 103.8 114.2 120.8 106.8 116.0 122.7 108.4 116 
Percentage 
change relative 
to the baseline -17.4 -13.1 -27.1 -28.0 -24.0 -32.6 -25.8 -21.6 -30.7 -24.7 -20.3 -29.6 
-
24.5
7 
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Table 8: Tax burden 
Excise tax burden (in percentage) 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 Scenario 9 Scenario 10 
Scenario 
11 
Scenario 
12 
Average 
Assumption 
on industry 
price 
No change 
in industry 
price 
Industry 
price 
increases 
by 10% 
Industry 
price 
decreases 
by 10% 
No change 
in industry 
price 
Industry 
price 
increases 
by 10% 
Industry 
price 
decreases 
by 10% 
No change 
in industry 
price 
Industry 
price 
increases 
by 10% 
Industry 
price 
decreases 
by 10% 
No change 
in industry 
price 
Industry 
price 
increases 
by 10% 
Industry 
price 
decreases 
by 10% 
Assumption 
on income 
growth 
No income 
growth 
effect 
No income 
growth 
effect 
No income 
growth 
effect 
Slow 
economic 
growth 
Slow 
economic 
growth 
Slow 
economic 
growth 
Medium 
economic 
growth 
Medium 
economic 
growth 
Medium 
economic 
growth 
High 
economic 
growth 
High 
economic 
growth 
High 
economic 
growth 
Baseline 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4 
Policy 
intervention 1 9.3 8.6 10.2 9.3 8.6 10.2 9.3 8.6 10.2 9.4 8.6 10.2 9 
Percentage 
change 
relative to the 
baseline 
 +136  +118  +158  +135  +117  +157  +136  +118  +158  +137  +118  +159 +137 
Policy 
intervention 2 11.1 10.3 12.1 11.1 10.2 12.1 11.1 10.3 12.1 11.2 10.3 12.2 11 
Percentage 
change 
relative to the 
baseline 
 +182  +162  +206  +180  +159  +205  +182  +160  +207  +183  +161  +208 +183 
Policy 
intervention 3 15.0 14.1 16.2 14.8 13.8 16.1 14.9 13.9 16.2 15.0 13.9 16.2 15 
Percentage 
change 
relative to the 
baseline 
 +281  +256  +310  +275  +249  +306  +278  +251  +309  +279  +252  +310 +280 
Policy 
intervention 4 26.2 24.7 27.0 23.6 22.2 25.2 23.9 22.5 25.5 24.0 22.6 25.6 24 
Percentage 
change 
relative to the 
baseline 
 +562  +525  +584  +498  +462  +538  +505  +469  +545  +508  +472  +548 +518 
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5.2 A three-year projection of results (in 2016 prices)  
We also performed a three-year projection of the proposed policy changes, which shows a 
consistent trend of increasing government revenues, and decreasing consumption and 
prevalence rates if policy interventions are sustained each year over the three-year period. 
Given that the excise tax burden is considered a more important benchmark for setting a 
tobacco control policy target, we simulate the impact of policy interventions that are 
benchmarked on it. Such policy targeting ensures that cigarette consumption and smoking 
prevalence remain low and maintain a steady decline over time, while government revenue 
steadily increases.  
Therefore, for PI.1, we maintain the base year (2016) policy change then add a ₦20 
increase in specific excise tax annually. For PI.2, PI.3, and PI.4, we set the base year (2016) 
policy change then add a two percentage point increase in the excise tax burden annually. 
The results are presented in Figure 1 and Appendix 3.  
 
Figure 1: Cigarette consumption, smoking prevalence, and government revenues for 
Scenario 1 
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6.  Conclusion and recommendations for 
future tobacco tax policy in Nigeria  
Tobacco taxation can prevent millions of smoking-attributable deaths throughout the country, 
reduce the number of young people initiating smoking, and contribute to the achievement of 
national public health objectives. It can also create the fiscal space needed to finance the 
country’s economic development and public health programmes. At present, the level of the 
excise tax is well below the WHO benchmark (set at 75 per cent of retail price) and this has 
an adverse present and future impact on smoking prevalence and smoking intensity, with 
attendant health and economic costs at household and national levels. From the perspective 
of public health and public finance, there is an urgent need to raise excise tax on tobacco 
products in the country.  
Our simulations show that a substantial upward review of excise tax level on cigarettes 
alongside a change to a specific excise tax system yields the most significant gains in public 
health (measured by reductions in cigarette consumption and smoking prevalence), as well 
fiscal revenue (measured by increase in excise tax and other government revenues). 
Specifically, policy interventions (PI.3 and PI.4) that substantially raise excise tax levels and 
apply the specific tax system record the most favourable outcomes, both in magnitude and 
direction.  
The implications of our findings are that, first, there is significant scope for upward review of 
the tobacco excise tax without having negative impacts on public health or government 
revenues. This holds under various scenarios and is robust to substantial sensitivity 
test/analysis. Second, changes in tax policy need to be significant to have the desired effect 
on public health and fiscal revenue. Third, under all policy interventions, the optimal 
response for the tobacco industry is to increase the industry price in order to maximise NOT 
revenue. The industry stands to lose revenue when it does nothing or decreases the industry 
price in efforts to possibly frustrate policy interventions. Fourth, in terms of setting policy 
targets and monitoring impact, tracking the excise tax burden is the most useful indicator 
relative to the excise tax rate, as focusing on the excise tax rate will mask the pass-through 
effect on retail prices. Fifth, given that the current excise tax burden is very low (at about 
6 per cent), even the most stringent policy intervention (PI.4) in our model yields a maximum 
excise tax burden of 27 per cent, hence still under-performing relative to the 
WHO-recommended benchmark of 75 per cent of retail price, which is based on a series of 
country studies and best practices. Thus, strong and consistent political will for tobacco 
control policies will be needed in order to continuously raise the excise tax burden annually 
and meet the WHO benchmark. Lastly, it is important to note that the measured outcomes 
from our model incorporate the potential impact of illicit trade in cigarettes following price 
adjustments of licit cigarettes.  
Therefore, based on the results of the study, an effective tobacco control tax policy will 
require that: the tax system is changed from ad valorem to specific tax system; and excise 
tax on tobacco products is continuously increased until it reaches the excise tax burden of 
75 per cent.  
A critical limitation of this study is that data gaps imposed constraints to the depth and rigor 
of the analysis. For instance, the lack of data on the quantity of cigarettes produced for each 
cigarette brand and the cost of production of each cigarette brand did not allow the 
researchers to perform cross-price analysis in order to estimate changes in the measured 
outcomes for each brand – in line with the WHO Tobacco Tax Simulation Model (TaXSiM). 
Nevertheless, the available data provided useful insights on the impact of changes in 
cigarette excise tax structure and level on public health and fiscal revenue, which can 
27 
provide useful guidance for intervention to policymakers. Going forward, there is a need to 
conduct country-specific baseline surveys that capture the critical data on tobacco products 
in order to close the data and research gaps.  
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Appendix 1: Cigarette brand prices collected for 
the study (in naira, per pack of 20 cigarettes) 
Brands/regions Company 
North-
Central 
North-
East 
North-
West 
South-
East 
South-
South 
South
-West Brand 
average 
Abuja Adamawa Kaduna Anambra Delta Lagos 
Pall Mall M BAT  150 150 100 90 100 250 140 
Pall Mall FF BAT 100 130 100 100 130 100 110 
Excel BAT 100 130 90 90   200 122 
Benson & Hedges BAT 300 250 190 180 250 200 228.3333 
Benson & Hedge Switch BAT 300 250 220 220 300 250 256.6667 
Benson & Hedges Demi 
Slim  
BAT 
150 200 200 130   200 176 
St Moritz BAT 200 200 100 170 200 200 178.3333 
St Moritz by Dunhill BAT 300 300 250 220 350 350 295 
Rothmans BAT 200 200   170 200 200 194 
Dunhill Switch BAT 350 400 190 200 350 300 298.3333 
Dunhill FF BAT 250   250 200     233.3333 
Dunhill Light BAT 250   250 200   230 232.5 
London M BAT 300 220   140   200 215 
London FF BAT 180 250 140 140   200 182 
Royal Standard BAT 120 100 90 90 100 200 116.6667 
Three Rings BAT   100 140 90 90 150 114 
Consulate BAT 400 400 300 450 450 250 375 
Rothmans Demi Slim BAT 200     200   200 200 
Aspen ITC 180 180 140 150   200 170 
Business Club ITC 300 200         250 
Dorchester Menthol ITC 180 200 180 130 180 200 178.3333 
Forum Menthol ITC           100 100 
Forum Regular ITC           150 150 
Yes LTCN 200 230 250 130 220   206 
Peterfield LTCN     190       190 
All Star Brand LTCN     150       150 
Marlboro PM 200 200 170 170 200 200 190 
Chesterfield PM 180 200 200 120 200 150 175 
Chesterfield Switch  PM 140 200 200 120 250 200 185 
Bond Menthol PM 100   100 80   150 107.5 
Edge Others 100         200 150 
Bohem Others 200   150       175 
Esse Change Others 200   200       200 
Oris Slims Others 300 200 200 160 250 200 218.3333 
Overall average retail price of cigarettes 190.0686 
 
*BAT – British American Tobacco (domestic producer); ITC – International Tobacco Company Ltd (domestic producer); LTCN – 
Leaf Tobacco & Commodities Nigeria Ltd (domestic producer). 
*PM – Phillip Morris (international producer/importer); Others – other imported cigarette brands. 
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Appendix 2: Cigarette brands segments and 
market share 
 Brand segments Market share when looking at entire market 
Market share when looking at 
domestic market 
Premium 51.1 54.01691332 
Economy 14.6 15.43340381 
Mid-priced 28.9 30.54968288 
Imported and other 5.4  
Total 100 100 
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Appendix 3: Three-year simulation outputs 
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